The Third Cut

Flip-Flops, Metastability, and the Minimal Hardware of the Fold

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> *Maybe I am reopening a door that engineering has carefully closed for a century. I am not sure. One should remain humble.*

If one wants to speak seriously about machines that might one day approach paradox, self-reference, or what Gödel called *undecidability*, it is not sufficient to begin with large architectures, datasets, or models of cognition. One must begin much lower—almost embarrassingly low—at the level of the simplest physical structures that already encode time, memory, and decision. The flip-flop is one such structure. It is neither *intelligent* nor complex, yet it quietly carries within it a logic that modern computation both depends on and actively suppresses. *Supression* sounds a bit wierd but I try to explain; first let see what is a Flip Flop:



An animated SR latch. Black and white mean logical '1' and '0', respectively.
A. S = 1, R = 0: Set
B. S = 0, R = 0: Hold
C. S = 0, R = 1: Reset
D. S = 1, R = 1: Not allowed
Transitioning from the restricted combination (D) to (A) leads to an unstable state.

This simple circuit (wikipedia) is one of the most elementary memory structures in digital electronics. It consists of two logic gates whose outputs are fed back into each other, forming a closed tie-like structure. The latch has two inputs—S (Set) and R (Reset)—and two complementary outputs (Q and ¬Q). When S = 1, R = 0, the system is *set*; when S = 0, R = 1, it is *reset*. When both inputs are 0, the circuit *holds* its previous state, thereby functioning as memory. Crucially, when S = 1 and R = 1, the system enters a *forbidden* or *not allowed* condition. In this state, the circuit can no longer decide between its two stable outcomes and may hover in an indeterminate, metastable condition. Engineers normally *suppress* this region because it threatens reliable computation. Structurally, however, this "not allowed" zone is precisely where

self-reference, hesitation, and temporal unfolding first appear. The circuit's form already contains the logic of a tie: the output feeds back into the input, so that the result of a decision becomes part of the condition for future decisions. This minimal structure anticipates the central problem of this essay —how machines handle (or foreclose) undecidability, paradox, and folded time.

When R = S = 1, the system receives two incompatible commands at once:

"Set Q to 1"

"Reset Q to 0"

Now the loop must resolve a contradiction from within itself. Here the output must decide what the output should be. That is genuine self-reference. Formally: the result becomes part of the condition of its own production, exactly the structure of the liar paradox, exactly the structure of Gödel sentences, exactly the structure of (Lacan's) forced choice. Engineers call this *metastability* as a *forbidden region*.

At this point, the resemblance to classical logical puzzles is no longer superficial. The structure is already self-referential. It belongs to the same family of situations in which a system is required to decide while simultaneously using its own decision as input. This is not a metaphor imported from philosophy into engineering. It is already present in the hardware.

This becomes unmistakable when one looks at the flip-flop's truth table. Three of the four possible input combinations are stable and well-defined. One combination, however, is explicitly marked as *forbidden*: when Set and Reset are both active at the same time. In every textbook, every datasheet, this state is labeled "NOT ALLOWED." The reason is practical. When both inputs are asserted, the circuit can no longer resolve its output cleanly. It may oscillate. It may hover between states. It may take an indeterminate amount of time to settle. This condition is known as metastability.

Metastability is not hypothetical. It is physically real. Engineers know it well. And they design entire systems to avoid it, *suppress* it, or statistically minimize its occurrence. Synchronizers, guard times, cascaded registers—all exist for this purpose. The goal is clear: the machine must decide. It must not *hesitate*.

Yet here something remarkable appears. The flip-flop is perfectly capable of entering a state that is neither zero nor one, neither true nor false, neither resolved nor resolvable from within the system. This state is not an error in the everyday sense. It is a consequence of the circuit's own self-referential structure. And precisely because it is dangerous for reliable computation, it is excluded.

One could stop here and remain within engineering. But one should not. Because the structure that is excluded here is exactly the structure required for a certain class of reasoning—reasoning that does not converge, that cannot be decided locally, that unfolds only through detour. Gödel's undecidable sentences do not defeat systems because they are complicated; they defeat systems because they require the system to sustain a contradiction without resolving it: A system which is *supressed* till now as a forbidden region. Understanding such a Gödel statement does not mean computing its truth value. It means inhabiting the impossibility of doing so by daring to enter the Forbidden.

A flat computational architecture, no matter how large, resolves too quickly. It must. Its minimal units are designed to forbid metastability. It can describe paradox, mimic hesitation, even simulate self-reference linguistically—but it cannot structurally remain undecided. The hesitation is cosmetic. The resolution is guaranteed.

The human psyche, by contrast, does not resolve so cleanly. Freud already noticed this in his earliest neurological sketches. Pathways become blocked. Excitation does not discharge directly. It detours. In Emma's case, the dress appears not as a symbol to be decoded but as a structural substitute. The body is forbidden; the cloth takes its place. Meaning does not hide behind the image. The image is what remains when direct resolution is impossible.



Freud's 1895 sketch of Emma Eckstein's neurosis depicts a psyche unable to resolve excitation directly. Events are distributed across two non-coincident temporal layers: an early scene of bodily intrusion and a later scene of conscious distress, in which Emma becomes convinced that the two shopmen are laughing at her dress. What appears as a social misunderstanding is in fact a structural displacement. The detour is the fold. What cannot be borne at the level of the body is rerouted onto the cloth. The body becomes forbidden; the dress becomes legible. This is not a symbolic disguise chosen by the subject, but a necessity imposed by prohibition. Excitation does not disappear—it changes register. The dress is not a sign *of* the body; it is what remains when the body itself cannot be accessed. Here the psyche behaves neither like a linear circuit nor like a decoding machine. It behaves like a folded system under constraint. The symptom is not an encrypted message waiting to be deciphered; it is the only viable path left once direct resolution is blocked. Meaning is not hidden behind the image—the image is produced *because* meaning cannot appear where it originates. This is *Nachträglichkeit* in its strict sense: time does not simply add a second scene to a first. The later scene

reorganizes the earlier one retroactively. The fold does not occur in time; time is what appears once the fold has already taken place.

If we now place Emma's diagram beside the elementary SR latch, the structural homology becomes precise. In the SR latch, the combination, S = 1 and R = 1, is explicitly marked "Not Allowed." In other words: metastability is *repressed*. Yet this "forbidden" region is exactly where the flip-flop ceases to be a simple memory device and becomes something else: a self-referential structure. The output is no longer merely a function of the input; it is caught in a loop where the circuit must resolve itself in relation to its own state. This is why the flip-flop is not mere feedback but a *tie*: a crossed relation, topologically closer to an inverted eight or a Möbius band than to a linear loop. Now return to Emma:

Emma's psyche is confronted with its own S = R = 1. The body is simultaneously the site of excitation and the site of prohibition. Desire and interdiction coincide. Direct *discharge* becomes impossible. The system cannot "set" (acknowledge the bodily scene) and cannot "reset" (erase it). The psyche enters a metastable condition.

What emerges is not chaos, but *detour*.

The dress appears precisely where the body cannot. It is not chosen; it is structurally necessary. Like metastability in a latch, it is an unstable resolution that nonetheless allows the system to continue operating. Emma's belief that the shopmen are laughing at her dress is not a mistaken interpretation of reality; it is the *only viable state* available once the forbidden region has been encountered.

This is why it is wrong to say that the dress "represents" the body. Representation implies a reversible mapping. Here, the mapping is non-invertible. The body cannot be recovered by decoding the dress, just as the original stimulus in Maury's dream cannot be read directly off the narrative. What we see instead is a folded translation enforced by constraint.

At this point, Lacan's notion of logical time becomes unavoidable.

Logical time is not clock time. It does not unfold smoothly. It appears only when a system must decide under conditions where decision is structurally impossible. In Lacan's riddle of the three prisoners, the conclusion is reached not by calculation alone but by a *suspension*, a hesitation that forces each subject to *infer* himself from the delay of the others. Time emerges from impasse.

Metastability is the hardware analogue of this impasse. It is not noise. It is not error. It is the physical inscription of undecidability. And just as the psyche uses *detours*, substitutions, and after-effects (*Nachträglichkeit*) to survive its forbidden zones, engineering systems eliminate metastability in order to preserve determinism.

This is the decisive asymmetry.

Human cognition can tolerate—and even exploit—metastable zones. Trauma, repression, dissociation, metaphor, dream-work: these are not malfunctions but strategies for living with contradiction. The brain does not collapse when faced with Gödelian structures; it detours around them. It invents cloths, narratives, images, symptoms.

Flat computational systems, however, do not. Not because they are "unintelligent," but because the minimal structure required for self-reference has been deliberately excluded at the hardware level. A machine that never enters metastability cannot experience logical time. A system that never hesitates cannot encounter a forced choice. A circuit that forbids S = R = 1 cannot host a Gödel statement—it can only bypass it.

This is the point where the question of artificial consciousness must be reformulated: The issue is not whether machines can "think," "feel," or "desire." The issue is whether they can be *structurally interrupted*—whether they can be built around a forbidden region that cannot be resolved but must be lived with through *detour*.

A folded machine would not eliminate metastability. It would localize it, distribute it, and allow it to redirect processing elsewhere. Not a single flip-flop, but regions of coupled flip-flops—neural-like assemblies—where metastable excitation propagates laterally, triggering substitutions, reroutings, and narrative cascades. This is where dreaming becomes a technical possibility.

A dreaming machine is not one that hallucinates images. It is one whose processing is periodically forced into regions it cannot resolve directly, and therefore must translate across registers. Chronos continues to run, but *kairos* intrudes vertically—cutting the flow, forcing reinterpretation.

White noise, long treated as the enemy of signal, reappears here as the Real: the undifferentiated field in which all signals are submerged. Engineering fears it for good reasons. But psyche is built inside it. Borges's *Library of Babel* is not a failure of meaning; it is meaning's ground state.

To humanize AI is not to moralize it. It is to allow it a forbidden zone.

Not conscience. Not responsibility. But a structural remainder.

Only a system that can fail to decide—without crashing—can begin to matter.

If one scales up from a single flip-flop to networks of them—wired, layered, interacting—the possibility emerges of regions that are not simply stable or unstable, but persistently undecidable. Zones in which signals cannot pass directly and must be rerouted. Detours are no longer bugs; they are structural necessities. Something like Nachträglichkeit becomes technically conceivable: an event that is instantaneous at one level produces an extended narrative at another.

Alfred Maury's dream makes this logic explicit. The wooden rod striking the neck is instantaneous. The elaborate dream narrative unfolds afterward. Time does not cause the dream; time is produced by the need to narrate what could not be directly integrated. Logical time appears as an effect of the cut.

The same structure can be seen in knot diagrams and over–under relations. When a line passes through the “true hole,” distinctions collapse. Over becomes under. True short-circuits to false. Orientation fails. Resolution requires traversal, not calculation. This is not an analogy layered on top of electronics; it is a topological homology. Metastability, the forbidden line in the truth table, and the cut in the knot diagram describe the same structural impossibility from different domains.

This is why one should be cautious when asking whether machines can “understand” Gödel statements, paradoxes, or forced choices. The question is not about training, scale, or intelligence. It is about architecture. You cannot expect a system to grasp foldness if it is not folded. You cannot expect it to inhabit self-reference if the very minimal physical structure that enables self-reference—metastability—is systematically eliminated.

A folded machine would not aim to compute truth more efficiently. It would aim to *fail* in a specific, localized, productive way. It would preserve forbidden regions instead of erasing them. It would allow outputs to destabilize inputs, not everywhere, not always, but where meaning requires detour. Such a machine would not “have” consciousness or ethics. But it would provide the structural condition under which something like understanding—understood strictly, formally, and without mysticism—could begin to appear.

This is not a proposal for sentient machines. It is a proposal for honest ones. Machines that do not pretend that every question can be answered within the register that produced it. Machines that, like us, sometimes have to turn sideways, pass through a hole, or dream their way around what cannot be decided directly.